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A MOOT COURT EXERCISE: DEBATING 
JUDICIAL REVIEW PRIOR TO 
MARBURY v. MADISON 
Donald F. Melhorn, Jr.* 
On August 31, 1797, student members of the Moot Court 
Society at Tapping Reeve's law school in Litchfield, Connecticut! 
suspended a rule requiring issues for argument to be put in hypo-
thetical cases, to permit their debating in the abstract a question 
which especially interested them: Have the judiciary a right to 
declare laws, which are unconstitutional, void? This moot court 
proceeding provides a rare pre-Marbury record of an actual ar-
gument and decision about what has come to be called the power 
of judicial review.z This article is the means of first publication of 
that record. 
Judicial review was a debatable but not yet widely debated 
constitutional question in 1797. How it was that American law 
students came to it then, as an issue for moot court argument, 
* © 1995 Donald F. Melhorn, Jr. An Ohio lawyer, the author practices in Toledo 
with the firm of Marshall and Melhorn. Professor Henry T. Greely of the Stanford Uni-
versity School of Law suggested the topical scope of this article, and Professor Henry J. 
Bourguignon of the University of Toledo College of Law, who read it in draft, made 
valuable recommendations for improving it. For help in finding and gaining access to 
materials in archives and libraries, thanks are especially due to Catherine Keene Fields, 
Director, and Nancy S. Beveridge of the Litchfield Historical Society; to John Grabowski, 
Curator of Manuscripts, Western Reserve Historical Society; to Judith Ann Schiff, Chief 
Research Archivist, Division of Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial Library, 
Yale University; and to Barbara B. Avery, Librarian, of Marshall and Melhorn. Jacqelyn 
M. Bain, Barbara Fallon, and Nancy L. Gorman provided capable assistance in transcrib-
ing the manuscript. 
I. For the history of the school, see generally Samuel H. Fisher, The Litchfield Law 
School, 1774-1833 (Yale U. Press, 1933) ("The Litchfield Law School"), and Marian C. 
McKenna, Tapping Reeve and the Litchfield Law School in 21 Connecticut Tercentenary 
Pamphlet Series (Oceana Press, 1986) ("Tapping Reeve"). 
2. For cases which stand as early examples of judicial review of state legislation, see 
Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, in I History of the Supreme Court 
of the United States 125-142 (MacMillian, 1971). Notably lacking from records and ac-
counts of virtually all such cases are arguments of counsel in opposition to claims that 
courts were empowered to pass on the constitutionality of laws. In State v. Parkhurst, 9 
N.J.L. (4 Halstead) 427 (1802), for example, counsel's submissions are not reported de-
spite Justice Kirkpatrick's noting that the case was "very ably and fully argued" and that 
the question "of late years has been considerably agitated in these United States," and 
"has enlisted many champions on both sides." I d. at 434, 443. 
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presents an intriguing inquiry for study in the history of early 
American legal education. As developed here, that inquiry will 
extend to the Litchfield Law School, its curriculum and methods 
of instruction, the practice in its Moot Court, the student advo-
cates who appeared in this case, and possible extracurricular 
sources of their interest in the issue they debated. 
I. THE LAW SCHOOL AND ITS MOOT COURT 
Tapping Reeve had lived in Litchfield since his admission to 
the Connecticut bar in 1772.3 For a time, like other lawyers, he 
taught students who apprenticed in his office; one of his first 
pupils was his brother-in-law, Aaron Burr.4 The transformation 
of that office teaching practice into a law school may be dated 
either from 1782, when Reeve began developing what would be-
come a highly structured, fifteen month course of lectures, or 
from 1784, when he constructed a small classroom building next 
to his home to accommodate a growing number of students.s 
Over the ensuing five decades of its operation the school 
would enjoy a national reputation and following. Reeve's ap-
pointment in 1798 as judge of the Superior Court6 prompted 
his taking James Gould into partnership, and they divided 
the lecture curriculum.? In 1820 Gould succeeded as sole 
proprietor,s and he ran the school until 1833 when his illness 
and rapidly declining attendance forced its closing.9 For its 
time, the program at Litchfield was "the best professional in-
struction available in the United States."1o A remarkably 
3. McKenna, Tapping Reeve at 32 (cited in note 1). 
4. Id. at 41. 
5. Fisher, The Litchfield Law School at 3-4 (cited in note 1). About 20 x 22 feet in 
size, and unheated, the building had been moved to another location when it was ac-
quired in the 1930's by a group of lawyers (including Chief Justice William Howard Taft), 
who restored it to its original site next to Reeve's home on South Street. McKenna, 
Tapping Reeve at 59-61 (cited in note 1). Both structures are now owned by the Litchfield 
Historical Society, and are open to visitors except during winter months. 
6. McKenna, Tapping Reeve at 89 (cited in note 1). 
7. Id. at 93. See also Fisher, The Litchfield Law School at 4 (cited in note 1). 
8. McKenna, Tapping Reeve at 166 (cited in note 1). 
9. Id. at 172. 
10. Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817-
1967 at 29 (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 1967). Twelve other proprietary law 
schools established between 1784 and 1828 are listed in Craig Evans Klafter, The Influ-
ence of Vocational Law Schools on the Origins of American Legal Thought, 37 Am. J. 
Legal Hist. 307, 323 n. 83 (1993). But Litchfield was the leader, and the 1,016 students it 
attracted over the entire period of its existence were at least as many as the others' com-
bined total. Klafter estimates "over sixteen hundred" for all of the schools. ld. at 323, 
324. 
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great number of the school's alumni had distinguished public 
careers.11 
The Litchfield students took extensive notes of the lectures, 
which they later transcribed "in a more neat and legible hand"Iz 
into bound notebooks comprising as many as five volumes, which 
they took with them for use in their practices. Passed down as 
heirlooms, the Litchfield student notebooks are a rich, though 
surprisingly neglected source for the early history of American 
legal education. More than fifty sets are now preserved.B The 
earliest are notes made by Eliphalet Dyer in 1790.14 With the 
next set, taken in 1794 by Asa Bacon,1s the general scheme of 
topical organization which the Litchfield lectures were to have 
for the duration of the school's existence is clearly seen. From 
then coverage is continuous, with intervals between sets seldom 
exceeding three or four years.16 
The lecture notes reflect development of study routines. 
Asa Bacon's 1794 notebooks, as well as all of the notebooks by 
the end of the century, contain marginal citations to the books, 
mostly English works, in Reeve's library. After mornings in the 
lecture hall, the students spent the remainder of the school day 
"examining the authorities cited in support of the several rules, 
and in reading the most approved authors upon those branches 
of the Law, which are at the time the subject of the lectures."11 
11. In a prodigious work of biographical research, the late Samuel H. Fisher counted 
two Vice Presidents of the United States (Aaron Burr and John Caldwell Calhoun), three 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices (Henry Baldwin, appointed in 1830; Levi Woodbury, in 1845; 
Ward Hunt, in 1873), six cabinet members, 28 U.S. Senators, 101 Members of Congress, 
14 Governors, 34 members of highest state courts, and 16 chief justices of such courts, as 
Litchfield alumni. Samuel H. Fisher, Litchfield Law School, 1774-1833, Biographical 
Catalogue of Students 3-4 (Yale U. Press, 1946) ("Biographical Catalogue"). 
12. Quoted from James Gould's Advenisement in Catalog of the Litchfield Law 
School, from 1793 to 1827 1nclusive iii (1828) ("Adverstisement'). The "Advertisement" 
is reprinted as the frontispiece of the catalog's third edition, George M. Woodruff and 
Archibald M. Howe, eds., The Litchfield Law School, 1787-1833 (Press of the Litchfield 
Enquirer, 1900). 
13. Appendix IV of McKenna, Tapping Reeve at 183-86 (cited in note 1), the "List 
of Students at Litchfield Law School and Location of Notebooks Extant," includes almost 
all of the notebooks found in archives open to researchers. 
14. The Dyer notes are at the Connecticut Historical Society in Hartford. Their 
date, 1790, is the earliest of any listed by McKenna. ld. 
15. Asa Bacon, (Litchfield Law School Notes, untitled) ("Notes") {1794). Bacon 
was "the last member of the bar of Litchfield County to discard the powdered hair and 
queue." Fisher, Biographical Catalogue at 14 (cited in note 11). His notes are in the 
Litchfield Historical Society archives. 
16. While a researcher interested in following the curricular development of a par-
ticular topic may have to travel to several locations to find all the notebooks spanning a 
period of interest, the topic will likely be found quite readily once a notebook is in hand, 
for in most cases it will appear consistently in the same place as lectures were repeated. 
17. Gould, Advenisement at iii (cited in note 12). 
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Use of Reeve's library was subject to strict rules, which prohib-
ited borrowing of all but a few "privileged" works.ls 
Besides lecture attendance, reading, and notebook writing, 
moot court exercises were a significant component of the learn-
ing experience throughout the school's existence. Eventually the 
Litchfield Moot Court would come to operate in the same way as 
other such tribunals, then and nowadays, with hypothetical cases 
put by faculty sponsors and argued by students, appearing as op-
posing counsel before professors or other members of the legal 
profession, sitting as judges. The moot court George Wythe 
founded as an adjunct to his law lectures at William and Mary 
was run on those lines: "Mr. Wythe & the other professors sit as 
Judges, Our Audience consists of the most respectable of the Cit-
izens, before whom we [students] plead Causes given out by Mr. 
Wythe."I9 But for a time which included at least the years 1796 
through 1798, arguments at Litchfield were conducted quite 
differently. 
Modelled after undergraduate debating societies at Yale 
College,zo from which many of its members had graduated, the 
Litchfield Moot Court was entirely student run, with students 
serving as judges21 as well as counsel, and choosing for them-
selves the questions they would argue. In December, 1796, they 
adopted a constitution which provided for wide sharing of lead-
ership functions, with officers elected for terms of only four 
weeks.22 At arguments held every Thursday evening the presi-
dent and two other members appointed in rotation would sit as 
18. Laws of the Office, reprinted in Appendix I of McKenna, Tapping Reeve at 177 
(cited in note 1 ). 
19. Letter of John Brown, a student at William and Mary College, to his uncle, Wil-
liam Preston, July 6, 1780, reprinted in Glimpses of Old College Life, (Continued), 9 Wm. 
& Mary College Q. Historical Magazine Ser. 1, 75, 79 (1900). 
20. Virtually all Yale undergraduates belonged to one or the other of two debating 
societies-Linonia, or Brothers in Unity-and some of the brightest were also members 
of Phi Beta Kappa. All these organizations had extensive self-administered programs of 
debate and oratory. See, e.g., Edmund S. Morgan, The Gentle Puritan, a Life of Ezra 
Stiles, 1727-1795 at 365-66 (Yale U. Press, 1962) ("The Gentle Puritan"); Lewis R. Pack-
ard, The Phi Beta Kappa Society, in William L. Kingsley, 1 Yale College, a Sketch of its 
History 324, 326 (Holt & Co., 1879). 
21. Samuel H. Fisher, The Litchfield Law School 8 (Yale U. Press, 1933) (cited in 
note 1). The moot court at Henry St. George Thcker's law school in Wmchester, Virginia 
also had student judges. Among the Charles James Faulkner Papers on deposit at the 
Virginia Historical Society in Richmond, in Box 47 of the collection, are examples both of 
arguments Faulkner made as counsel, and of decisions he rendered as "president" of the 
court in 1826 while he was a student. The decisions were appealable to the society's other 
members who attended the arguments; Faulkner frequently notes their actions of affirm-
ance and reversal. 
22. McKenna, Tapping Reeve at 181 (cited in note 1). Litchfield Moot Hall Society 
"Constitution," Arts. 1st, 2d, 6th, 7th (December 8, 1796). The Constitution is reprinted 
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judges, and members in alphabetical order would take turns as 
counseJ.23 The Moot Court clerk, an elected officer, had the im-
portant duty of "report[ing] such cases as shall be brought before 
the Society, with the decisions thereon and the grounds of those 
decisions."24 The reports which survive are found in two copy-
books, entitled, respectively, "Reports of Cases Disputed and 
Determined in Mr. Reeve's Office, from 8th December, 1796 to 
July 28th, 1797," and "Continuation of Reports of Cases Argued 
and Determined in Moothall Society from August 5th 1797 to 
July 12, 1798. "zs Each report begins with a statement of the case 
and ends with a summary of the judges' opinions, delivered seria-
tim from the bench, with a lengthy middle portion consisting of 
apparently complete transcripts of arguments of counsel, proba-
bly copied from drafts written out in advance.26 Reeve did not 
routinely attend the arguments, but his subsequent comments 
were sometimes noted. 
Issues for argument were chosen by agreement of the coun-
sel assigned for each session, and framed with "writs, pleadings, 
etc. in the same manner as a suit or the like Question would be 
bro't before a regular Court."27 Confident of their ability to ar-
ticulate theory and policy, student advocates often put questions 
of first impression, and cases which explored sources of law in 
the new republic, and limits of judicial power.28 The imagina-
tiveness and sophistication of these choices were also products of 
college debate experience, notably in required academic exer-
cises at Yale, where "[d]isputations were the keystone of [Yale 
sub nom. Rules of the Debating Society in Mr. Reeve's Office, 1796-97, in McKenna, Tap-
ping Reeve at 181-82 (cited in note 1 ). 
23. Id. 
24. Moot Hall Society "Constitution," Art. 5th (cited in note 22). 
25. Hereinafter cited as 1 Litchfield Moot Ct. MS and 2 Litchfield Moot Ct. MS, the 
manuscripts are in the archives of the Litchfield Historical Society's Henga J. Ingraham 
Memorial Library. The Society has kindly granted permission to quote from or transcribe 
the portions which appear in this article. 
26. Preparing written drafts of oral arguments was also a practice of students at 
Henry St. George Thcker's law school in Winchester. But at the end of one of the drafts 
he had prepared, Charles James Faulkner ruefully noted: "The above remarks were not 
advanced by me, as I discovered after entering the Moot Court, that I was ranged upon 
the opposite side." Charles James Faulkner Papers (cited in note 21). 
27. Moot Hall Society "Constitution," Art. 8th (cited in note 22). 
28. For an argument held February 23, 1797, the question whether recovery on a 
wagering contract-a right of action under English common law, and not denied by any 
Connecticut statute-might be had in a Connecticut court, was the vehicle for exploring 
the freedom of American courts to disregard British precedents and fashion new rules of 
substantive law on matters as to which American legislatures had not yet spoken. That 
case was decided by split decision, two judges holding that English common law should be 
followed until altered by legislation, and a dissenter arguing that "we have no authority to 
bind us, but rules of good policy." 1 Litchfield Moot Ct. MS at 51, 64 (cited in note 25). 
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president Ezra] Stiles's curriculum"29 and many of the topics 
upon which he challenged his students to deliberate were matters 
of current political and constitutional significance.3o And at 
Litchfield, of course, the Moot Court rule requiring adversaries 
to agree on issues they would argue discouraged selection of any 
with pat answers. Indeed the issue for the first argument re-
ported on, held the night the Moot Hall Society's constitution 
was adopted, still has no definite answer in American commer-
cial law: 
A sells a horse to B that has a secret disorder & affirms 
him to be sound to B. B before he discovers the disorder sells 
him to C; in the hands of C the horse dies. Can C have an 
action directly against A ?31 
II. THE STUDENT ADVOCATES 
By the time judicial review was argued on Thursday evening, 
August 31, 1797, the Moot Court Society constitution's provision 
for alphabetical order in members' taking turns as counsel was 
not being followed strictly. But nothing in the Moot Court rec-
ord suggests any departure from the practice of allowing counsel 
for each session to choose the question they would argue. They 
put the question of judicial review as a debate proposition, to be 
argued in the abstract: "Have the judiciary a right to declare 
laws, which are unconstitutional, void?" This avoided the two-
issue argument that a hypothetical case concerning a particular 
law's claimed unconstitutionality would have presented.32 
29. Morgan, The Gentle Puritan at 397 (cited in note 20). 
30. In earlier years Stiles's assigned debate topics had included amnesty for the To-
ries (in 1783); whether a Constitutional convention should be held, and then, whether its 
product should be ratified (both in 1787). Morgan, The Gentle Puritan at 396-97 (cited in 
note 20). In 1794 and 1795, years when the students who would argue judicial review in 
the Litchfield Moot Court were Yale upperclassmen, Stiles's assignments for debates for 
which they prepared arguments included the French Revolution, direct vs. indirect taxa-
tion, exemption of clergy from taxation, the usury laws, the probability of future federal 
government encroachment on the rights and powers of states, and emancipation of slaves 
held in Connecticut. Debate copybooks of George Tod, in Box 1 of his papers, Collection 
No. 3203 of the archives of Western Reserve Historical Society Archives, Cleveland, 
Ohio. Stiles died in office, in May, 1795. Morgan, The Gentle Puritan at 461 (cited in 
note 20) 
31. 1 Litchfield Moot Ct. MS at 5-8 (Dec. 8, 1796) (cited in note 25). "[W]hether the 
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distribu-
tive chain" remains a topic of "developing case law." Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-318, 
Official Comment 3. 
32. The Moot Court clerk who reported the argument was careful to note the mem-
bership's permission to present the question "in a form different fro~ tha.t prescribed by 
the constitution." 2 Litchfield Moot Ct. MS at 33 (Aug. 31, 1797) (Cited m note 25). 
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The students who chose judicial review as an argument topic 
were three of the Moot Court's ablest advocates: Stephen Twin-
ing for the affirmative side and George Tod and Thomas Scott 
Williams for the negative. All were from Connecticut; all were 
Yale graduates. Twining and Tod had been presidents, respec-
tively, of the college's two debating societies33, and as fellow 
members of its chapter of Phi Beta Kappa34 they had partici-
pated in that organization's extensive program of forensic activi-
ties.3s Twining, a former schoolmaster, was 30 at the time of the 
argument, 28 when he graduated from Yale. Tod, six years 
younger, had been president of the Moot Court Society when the 
constitution was adopted. Williams was the youngest: 17 when 
he graduated from Yale, in 1794, a year ahead of 1\vining and 
Tod. He was an exceptionally brilliant law student: Reeve would 
later call him "the best scholar ever sent out from Litchfield. "36 
III. THE LITCHFIELD LECTURE CURRICULUM: A 
MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCE 
Reeve's lectures began with an introduction to law and the 
legal process37 taken directly from the first chapter of Sir William 
Blackstone's Commentaries.3s In the third section of that chap-
ter, "Of the laws of England," Blackstone laid down ten enumer-
ated "rules to be observed with regard to the construction of 
statutes."39 The tenth rule, which received a great deal of atten-
tion in America, was his pronouncement on Bonham's Case.40 In 
that decision, rendered nearly two centuries before, Sir Edward 
33. Catalogue of the Graduated Members of the Linonian Society of Yale College, 
during One Hundred Years from its Foundation in September, 1753 at 24 (Linonian Soci-
ety, 1853); Catalogue of the Society of Brothers in Unity, Yale College 8 (New Haven, 
1854). 
34. Phi Beta Kappa Society, Alpha of Connecticut, Minutes of Meetings, August, 
1787 - June, 1801, MS in the Archives and Manuscripts Division, Sterling Memorial Li-
brary, Yale University, entry for June 23, 1794. 
35. Some Phi Beta Kappa debate topics were remarkably forward looking. For a 
meeting held the day after 1\vining and Tod were initiated, the question was: "Ought the 
Education of Females to be more assimilated to that of the Males?" I d., entry for July I, 
1794. 
36. Fisher, Biographical Catalogue at 137 (cited in note 11). 
37. As given November 4, 1794, the lecture with this introduction is recorded begin-
ning on page I of the fourth volume of Bacon, Notes (cited in note 15). Daniel Sheldon 
recorded it under the title "Of Municipal Law" when he heard Reeve give the lecture in 
January, 1798: that record begins on the first unnumbered page of Sheldon's one-volume 
notebook, now in the Litchfield Historical Society's archives. 
38. Sir William M. Blackstone, I Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon 
Press, 1st ed. 1765) ("Commentaries"). 
39. Id. at •87-91. 
40. Id. at *91. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. (8 Co. Rep.ll3b (Hil. 7 Jac. 1)) 646 
(1900). 
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Coke had proclaimed the subordination of statutory enactments 
to fundamental tenets of the common law, and had claimed for 
courts the power to enforce that subordination: "[W]hen an Act 
of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant 
... the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be 
void."41 Not surprisingly, Bonham's Case was frequently cited in 
American courts in support of challenges to the validity of acts of 
Parliament or early state legislation.42 But its authority was un-
dermined by Blackstone's restrictive restatement-amounting in 
principle to rejection-of Coke's doctrine. Blackstone's tenth 
rule allowed courts to reject unreasonable application of statutes 
only under circumstances which the legislature presumably had 
not foreseen.43 But if judicial power over statutes were thus lim-
ited to granting dispensations in exceptional cases to which 
judges were satisfied that a law had not been meant to apply, 
then courts might only implement, never thwart, legislative in-
tent, and no principle of subordination of legislative power to 
fundamental or other higher law could be recognized. Thus, said 
Blackstone, 
. . . if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done 
which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it: 
and the examples usually alledged in support of this sense of 
the rule do none of them prove, that where the main object of 
a statute is unreasonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; 
for that were to set the judicial power above that of the legisla-
ture, which would be subversive of all government.44 
As recounted in the Litchfield lecture curriculum, this pas-
sage became the setting for interstitial discussion of whether 
American courts might invalidate statutes for conflict with the 
higher law of a written constitution. The first mention of this in 
student notebooks is found in Asa Bacon's notes of a lecture 
Reeve gave in November, 1794. The "maxim that statutes made 
against natural justice are void" is bad law, Reeve said, for if "ad-
mitted with its full sense [it] enables [the courts] to reject 
whatever statutes they please."4s That much is vintage Black-
41. 77 Eng. Rep. (8 Co. Rep.118a (Hil. 7 Jac. 1)) 652 (1900). 
42. Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 
30, 61-68 (1926). 
43. "But where some collateral matter arises out of the [statute's] general words, 
and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this 
consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to 
expound the statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it." Blackstone, 1 Commen-
taries at *91 (cited in note 38). 
44. Id. 
45. Bacon, 4 Notes at 9 (cited in note 15). 
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stone. But then Reeve added, "If a statute is past [sic] by the 
Legislature, derogatory to the established constitution the judiciary 
need not carry it into execution but may declare it void. See the 
Eng. ideas upon this subject." And here Reeve cited Bonham's 
Case, together with other English decisions the students could 
read in his library.46 
But Bonham's and the few other cases that echoed its doc-
trine47 were the decisions Blackstone had deprecated, as "exam-
ples usually alledged" to support, but which "do none of them 
prove" claims of judicial power to invalidate legislation.48 No 
American lawyer ever succeeded in reconciling Blackstone's 
tenth rule with any hypothesis of judicially enforceable limita-
tions on legislative power, where such limitations were derived 
from sources apart from the organic instrument-if there were 
such-from which the legislature itself derived its authority.49 
As Mr. Justice Iredell would come to observe a year after judicial 
review was argued at Litchfield, "the consequence" of not having 
a constitution which sets limits on a legislature's authority 
"would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose 
to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could 
never interpose to pronounce it void."so But where legislative 
authority was both derived from and restricted by a constitution, 
46. ld. (emphasis added). As noted by Bacon, Reeve's citations were "Hobt Pfl" 
[Day v. Savadge, 80 Eng. Rep. (Hobart 85-Pfl (Brownlow. Tr. 12 Jac. Rot. 619)) 235, 237 
(1900)]; "8 Coke 118, 107'' [Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. (8 Co. Rep. 107a (Mich. 6 
Jacobi 1)) 638 (1900), 77 Eng. Rep. (8 Co. Rep. 113b (Hil. 7 Jac. 1)) 646 (1900)]; and "1 
Lev. 73" [Wheatly v. Thomas, 83 Eng. Rep. (1 Levinz 73 (K.B. 1662)) 303 (1900)]. Ba-
con's note of a fourth citation is illegible. 
47. These cases, which include Day v. Savadge, are chronicled in Plucknett, 40 Harv. 
L. Rev. at 49-53 (cited in note 42). 
48. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *91 (cited in note 38). 
49. Citing Blackstone's exception for relieving against enforcement of a statute in 
unusual circumstances to which the legislature presumably had not intended it to apply, 
Hamilton argued in Rutgers v. Waddington that application in that case of a principle of 
international law, "higher" at least in the sense of its addressing "the most important 
concerns," should always be presumed to have been the legislature's intention, regardless 
of what its statute might provide-unless a purpose to interdict such application was ex-
pressly declared. Rutgers v. Waddington, New York City Mayor's Court, 1784, excerpted 
in Richard B. Morris, ed., Select Cases in the Mayor's Court of New York City 302, 326 
(American Historical Association, 1935). Julius Goebel, Jr., ed., 1 The Law Practice of 
Alexander Hamilton 305, 381-83 (Columbia U. Press, 1964) ("Law Practice"). Persuaded 
by the argument, Mayor James Duane held that "[w]hoever then is clearly exempted from 
the operation of this statute by the law of nations, ... could never have been intended to 
be comprehended within it by the Legislature." Rutgers, New York City Mayor's Court in 
Morris, Select Cases in the Mayor's Coun of New York City at 326. But Duane's opinion 
was widely condemned, and Hamilton's client settled, unwilling to risk an appeal. Goe-
bel, Law Practice at 311-13 supra; Charles Grove Haines, The American Doctrine of Judi-
cial Supremacy 201-04 (MacMillian, 1914). 
50. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). 
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the courts would enforce such restrictions-not as supervening, 
but as inherent limitations on lawmaking power. 
This distinction, fundamental to American claims about the 
power of judicial review,s1 was not expounded by Reeve to his 
students. Whether one of them might have challenged him, 
pointing out that no such power could be inferred from Bon-
ham's and the other cases Reeve cited, as Blackstone read those 
cases, is conjectural. What is apparent is that after its maiden 
appearance in 1794 in the lecture recorded in Asa Bacon's 
notes,s2 judicial review disappeared for a time from the Litchfield 
curriculum. When Tod heard the lecture in 1796, the year before 
judicial review was argued, he noted Reeve as saying only that 
the assertion that "courts are not bound to decide upon the Stat-
utes, contrary to reason and the law of God" was "hollow," and 
would "at once set [the courts] above the legislature."s3 Daniel 
Sheldon, who had served as clerk of the Moot Court, carefully 
recorded the lecture when Reeve next gave it in 1798, the year 
after judicial review was argued. On that occasion Reeve again 
simply paraphrased Blackstone: "[t]he Cts. are bound by the acts 
of the Legislature, & once give them the power of saying that a 
Stat. is contrary to reason or the law of God, & they are exalted 
above the Legislature. "54 Thus, it is fair to conclude that when 
Twining, Tod and Williams chose judicial review as a question to 
argue in the Moot Court, they had heard nothing about it in the 
classroom apart from Reeve's seconding Blackstone's denuncia-
tion of the doctrine of Bonham's Case. 
51. In the same opinion, Mr. Justice Iredell went on to say, "If any act of Congress, 
or of the Legislature of a state, violates [Federal or state] constitutional provisions, it is 
unquestionably void .... If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legis-
lature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their 
constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is. in 
their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. . . . There are then but two 
lights in which the subject can be viewed: 1st. If the Legislature pursue the authority 
delegated to them, their acts are valid. 2d. If they transgress the boundaries of that au-
thority, their acts are invalid." ld. at 399. 
52. Bacon, 4 Notes at 9 (cited in note 15). 
53. George Tod, 1 Notes from Tapping Reeve Esq.'s Lectures, on the Laws of Eng-
land and Connecticut, taken in the Years 1796 and 1797 at 3 (1796). A three volume man-
uscript set, these notes are now in the Western Reserve Historical Societ~'s a~chives. 
They are not listed in Appendix IV of McKenna, Tapping Reeve at 183-86 (etted m note 
1). 
54. Daniel Sheldon, Notes Taken from Judge Reeve's Lectures upon Law 4b (1798). 
Sheldon's notes comprise one manuscript volume, now in the Litchfield Historical Society 
archives. 
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IV. WHAT THE STUDENTS MIGHT HAVE READ: THE 
BEGINNINGS OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
The first three appointments to law professorships in Ameri-
can universities were George Wythe's at William and Mary in 
1779,55 U.S. Supreme Court Justice James Wilson's at the College 
of Philadelphia in 1789,56 and future New York Chancellor James 
Kent's at Columbia in 1793.57 All were advocates of judicial re-
view. But it is doubtful that the Litchfield students who argued 
that question would have read anything written by Wythe or Wil-
son, containing their pronouncements on it. Wythe's was made 
from the bench, as one of the judges of the Virginia Court of 
Appeals, an office he occupied concurrently with his professor-
ship. But the report of the case containing his opinion, 
Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. ( 4 Call) 5, 13 (1782), was not pub-
lished unti11827, many years after his death. His lectures, never 
published, have been lost.5s Wilson's lecture59 was first pub-
lished in 1804. 
Kent's endorsement was a principal topic of the inaugural 
lecture he delivered at Columbia in November, 1794, and pub-
55. For George Wythe's appointment at William and Mary, see Imogene E. Brown, 
American Aristides, a Biography of George Wythe 200-01 (Associated U. Press, 1981). 
56. The circumstances of Wilson's appointment are recounted in the entry for him in 
Dumas Malone, ed., 10, part 2 Dictionary of American Biography 326, 329 (Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1936). In 1791, by a name change, the College of Philadelphia became 
the University of Pennsylvania. Martin Meyerson and Dilys Pegler Winegrad, Gladly 
Learn and Gladly Teach: Franklin and His Heirs at the University of Pennsylvania, 1740-
1976 240 (U. of Pennsylvania Press, 1978). 
57. As to Kent's appointment, see John Theodore Horton, James Kent, a Study in 
Conservatism 1763-1847 at 86-87 (D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc .. 1939) ("James 
Kent"). Kent's course failed to attract students, and he resigned his professorship in 1797. 
Appointed again to a Columbia professorship after leaving the bench in 1823, he began a 
second course of lectures from which came his celebrated Commentaries on American 
Law, first published in 1826. Horton, James Kent at 95, 269 supra. 
58. For the circumstances of the loss, see Brown, American Aristides at 224-26 (cited 
in note 55). 
In Professor Crosskey's judgment the Caton opinion posthumously reported for 
Wythe was "tall talk, hardly in character ... hard to credit as authentic." William Winslow 
Crosskey, 2 Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 954 (U. of 
Chicago Press, 1953). But Professor Treanor has recently established that, at least as to 
the fact of Wythe's explicitly endorsing judicial review, the report is supported by notes of 
another member of the court, its presiding judge, Chancellor Edmund Pendleton. Wil-
liam Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 491, 530-34 (1994). Remaining, however, is the question whether the re-
porter, Daniel Call, might have warmed up the rhetoric of Wythe's endorsement-"point-
ing to the constitution" and saying to the legislature, "here is the limit of your authority; 
and, hither, shall you go, but no further," Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 8. As to that question, 
the missing record of Wythe's professorial utterances might have been conclusive. 
59. Bird Wilson, ed., The Comparison of the Constitution of the United States, with 
that of Great Britain, 1 The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, LL.D. 425, 460-62 
(Lorenzo Press, 1804). 
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lished shortly thereafter at the request of the College trustees.60 
The number of copies which today may be found in American 
research libraries61 suggests that it had some substantial circula-
tion, and it would have found interested readers in New Haven62 
and at Litchfield. Comparison with Twining's submission for the 
affirmative side in the Moot Court case reveals at least one in-
triguing similarity: both arguments for judicial review began by 
identifying the doctrine as peculiar to governments under written 
constitutions.63 But if Twining had read Kent's lecture he missed 
the most prescient of Kent's points: judicial review's indispens-
ability for protecting constitutional rights of political minorities.64 
In 1795 and 1796 Zephaniah Swift, a Connecticut lawyer, 
published the two volumes of his A System of the Laws of the 
State of Connecticut,65 stating in his introduction that he had "not 
scrupled to take advantage of the writings of all who have 
preceeded [sic] him. "66 That advantage was considerable, for 
Swift appropriated from the Commentaries all of Blackstone's 
topics and topical organization and much of his text, adding ref-
erences to Connecticut law and practice that would have at-
tracted the Litchfield students' attention. Reeve's library had 
60. James Kent, An Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law Lectures, Delivered 
November 17, 1794 (Francis Childs, 1794), reprinted as Kent's Introductory Lecture, 3 
Colum. L. Rev. 330 (1903). 
61. The American Library Association's National Union Catalog locates eleven cop-
ies in current collections. American Library Association, 293 National Union Catalog 477 
(Balding & Mansell, Ltd., 1973). 
62. Kent graduated from Yale in the 1781. His contacts among the New Haven bar 
included his friend and classmate Simeon Baldwin, who sent Kent a gift of books during 
the first year of his professorship. Letter of James Kent to Moss Kent, March 1, 1795, 
reprinted in William Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent, LL.D. Late Clumcellor of 
the State of New York 74, 75 (Little Brown, 1898). 
63. Kent said: "The doctrine I have suggested is peculiar to the United States. In 
the European World, no idea has ever been entertained (or at least until lately) of placing 
constitutional limits to the exercise of the legislative power." Kent, 3 Col urn. L. Rev. at 
334 (cited in note 60). 
Twining began by stating: "A written Constitution binding the powers of Govern-
ment is a novel thing; it is known only in France and the United States. Other nations 
have the name of a constitution without the thing - from what has taken place under such 
Governments we can therefore argue nothing." 2 Litchfield Moot Court MS at 33 (cited 
in note 25) (argument held August 31, 1797). 
64. "Without [constitutional rights being] ... constantly protected by the firmness 
and moderation of the judicial department, the equal rights of a minor faction, would 
perhaps very often be disregarded in the animated competitions for power, and fall a 
sacrifice to the passions of a fierce and vindictive majority." Kent, 3 Colum. L. Rev. at 
335 (cited in note 60). 
65. Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (John Byrne, 
1795-96) (in 2 volumes) ("A System"). 
66. Swift, 1 A System at 5 (cited in note 65). 
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several copies of Swift's System;67 it was one of the few "privi-
leged" works that students were allowed to borrow.68 
Like Reeve, Swift used Blackstone's tenth rule as an intro-
duction for addressing the claim that American courts might pass 
on the constitutionality of legislation. But in Swift's view only 
legislators and those who had elected them were competent to 
judge the conformity of legislative enactments with constitutional 
limitations: "the majesty of the people, and the supremacy of the 
government"69 were concentrated in the legislature, whose mem-
bers "stand in the place of the people, and are vested with all 
their power, within the constitution."?o Since "[p]reviously to 
their [the legislators'] passing any act, they must consider and de-
termine whether it be compatible with the constitution," the 
supremacy of their authority would make it a "manifest absurd-
ity, and ... degrading to the legislature, to admit the idea, that 
the judiciary may rejudge the same question which they have de-
cided. "71 Swift would have such determinations submitted to 
electoral, not judicial review: "[o]n this power of the people over 
the legislature, depends their security against all encroachments, 
and not on the vigilance of the judiciary department. "n A conse-
quence of exercising such judicial "vigilance" which especially 
troubled Swift was the prospect that lower courts "may decide 
differently, and [so] the obligation to obey a law may be uncer-
tain, till some individual brings the question before the supreme 
tribunal for ultimate decision."73 The legislature would "lose all 
regard and veneration in the eyes of the people, when the lowest 
tribunals of judicature are permitted to exercise the power of 
questioning the validity, and deciding on the constitutionality of 
its acts."74 If, as seems quite likely, Twining, Tod and Williams 
had read these passages, they would have found in Swift's attack 
67. Three sets are listed in the inventory of the library filed in Reeve's estate. A 
manuscript copy of that inventory, dated February 14, 1824, is in the Litchfield Historical 
Society archives. 
68. Laws of the Office, Law III, reprinted in Appendix I of McKenna, Tapping 
Reeve at 177 (cited in note 1 ). 
69. Swift, 1 A System at 35 (cited in note 65). 
70. ld. 
71. Id. at 52. 
72. I d. at 53. Justice John Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reach 
the same conclusion in Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 354 (Pa. 1825). His dissent 
in that case may have been the last occasion when the constitutionality of judicial review 
was disputed by an American jurist. Subsequently, as Chief Justice, he withdrew from 
that opinion. Menges v. Wenman, 1 Pa. 218, 222 (1845); Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 
(1846). 
73. Swift, 1 A System at 53 (cited in note 65). 
74. Id. 
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on judicial review an exhilarating topic for a Moot Court 
argument. 
That the students read two other possibilities as sources of 
their interest in that topic must be discounted. For the Symsbury 
Case,75 a 1785 Connecticut decision which some legal historians 
have claimed and others, more convincingly, have rejected as a 
precedent for early exercise of the power of judicial review,16 
there is no evidence of contemporary recognition of the case's 
having any such significance.77 That the students read The 
Federalist seems unlikely. At least there is no evidence of that 
work, with Alexander Hamilton's claim of judicial review as an 
attribute of federal jurisprudence,1s ever coming to their notice. 
Nor was it mentioned in Wilson's or Kent's lectures. Perhaps 
these omissions reflect a temporary eclipse. Infrequently cited in 
judicial opinions published during the first decade of government 
under the Constitution,79 The Federalist would not have a second 
edition until 1799.so 
V. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE PENSION 
ACT CASES: A CONNECTICUT CONNECTION 
Coming finally to ask whether the Litchfield students' inter-
est in judicial review as a debate topic might have been sparked 
by some current legal development in the world beyond 
Litchfield, we start with a surprise. Twining began his argument 
75. 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1785). 
76. The court held for claimants under the earlier of two conflicting legislative 
grants of land, who had not consented to an adjustment of grant boundaries, provided for 
in a survey subsequently commissioned by the legislature in an attempt to resolve the 
conflict. The report does not indicate that the legislature had sought to impose the survey 
without consent, nor did the court address in dicta the power of the judiciary to invalidate 
legislation on any ground. Citations of the case as a precedent for judicial review have 
properly been challenged. Compare, e.g., Edwin S. Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial 
Review, 9 Mich L. Rev. 102, 114 (1910), and Haines, American Doctrine at 88 (cited in 
note 49), with Crosskey, 2 Politics and the Constitution at 961 (cited in note 58). 
77. Corwin's suggestion that "we may well believe" that Connecticut delegate Oli-
ver Ellsworth "had the decision in the Symsbury case in mind" when he observed at the 
Constitutional Convention that "there was no lawyer ... who would not say that ex post 
facto Jaws were of themselves void," Corwin, 9 MichL. Rev. at 114 (cited in note 76), is 
farfetched. Zephaniah Swift did not mention the case in denouncing the doctrine of judi-
cial review, although his book has numerous citations to Kirby's Reports. See generally, 
Swift, 1, 2 A System (cited in note 65). 
78. See generally, The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). 
79. The earliest cases in Dallas' Reports are Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 4 U.S. (4 
Dall.) xxvi, xxviii, xxx (Phila. Mayor's Court, 1797), and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
386, 391 (1798) (Chase, J., concurring). The Federalist was not cited in Marbury v. 
Madison. 
80. The Federalist: a collection of essays, written in favour of the new Constitution, as 
agreed upon by the Federal convention, September 17, 1787 (J. Tiebout, 1799). 
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noting that he would rely on "principle," and that "tho the 
Supreme Court of the USA have [sic] determined this question-
their [sic] opinion will be made no use of in the present case."si 
This is the only mention by any of the participants in the Moot 
Court argument of a United States Supreme Court ruling. What 
was the ruling? And how may TWining's reference to it be recon-
ciled, say, with the judicial memory of Justice Samuel Chase, who 
would come a few years later to observe that while some of his 
colleagues had "individually, in the Circuits, decided, that the 
Supreme Court can declare an act of congress to be unconstitu-
tional, and, therefore invalid ... there is no adjudication of the 
Supreme Court itself upon the point"?82 
Twining was not the only one who thought, prior to Mar-
bury, that the Court already had claimed the power of judicial 
review.s3 Perhaps he confused a widely held expectation that the 
Court would do so.84 Or he might have had in mind the rulings 
of individual Justices sitting as members of the federal circuit 
bench, to which Mr. Justice Chase later referred.ss It is remotely 
possible that Twining had heard of a case in which the Court had 
exercised the power by rejecting on the merits a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a federal tax on carriages.s6 But there is yet 
81. Twining's argument is reported in full beginning on page 347 below. He began 
by saying: 
A written Constitution binding the powers of Government is a novel thing: 
it is known only in France and the United States. Other nations have the name 
of a Constitution without the thing - from what has taken place under such Gov-
ernments we can therefore argue nothing. We must then resort to principle to 
determine this case and tho the Supreme Court of the USA have [sic] deter-
mined this question - their [sic] opinion will be made no use of in the present 
case. 
2 Litchfield Moot Coun MS at 33 (cited in note 25) (argument held August 31, 1797). 
82. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18 (1800) (Chase, J. concurring). 
83. In 1802, the year before the Marbury decision was announced, New Jersey 
Supreme Court Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick cited unspecified "reported decisions involv-
ing the same question in the Supreme Court of the United States of America" as support-
ing his ruling upholding the power under state law. State v. Parkhurst 9 N.J.L. (4 
Halstead) 427, 444-45 (1802). 
84. Both the Framers, or some of them, and the Anti-Federalists had that expecta-
tion. For extensive citations, see David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Con-
cept of Judicial Review, 42 Duke L.J. 279, 284 n.9 (1992). 
85. The rulings are chronicled in Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings at 589-91 
(cited in note 2). 
86. U.S. v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). Dallas' report, not published until 
1799, makes no mention of counsel or any of the Justices addressing any question con-
cerning the Court's power to make such a ruling. Explaining to the Circuit Court why he 
would not contest the point when the case was heard there below, the attorney who rep-
resented the United States cited "information I have received from the bench" that 
"though never solemnly decided by the supreme court, it has come before each of the 
judges in their different circuits, and they have all concurred in [claiming the power]"-a 
consensus which enabled him "gladly [to] waive the investigation of a subject, that de-
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one other possible explanation for Twining's assertion that "the 
Supreme Court of the USA have [sic] determined this question," 
which merits brief attention. 
In 1792 Congress provided for pensions for disabled Revolu-
tionary War veterans, requiring claims first to be submitted to the 
federal circuit courts for approval, then forwarded to the Secre-
tary of War for allowance or, if disapproved by the Secretary, to 
Congress for final determination.s7 But the constitutionality of 
that procedure was widely questioned, either for requiring fed-
eral judges to perform duties not judicial in character, or, if the 
duties were of that character, for making the judges' determina-
tions improperly subject to revision by the executive and legisla-
tive branches.BB An amended Pension Act adopted the following 
year eliminated those objections by substituting a different adju-
dicative process.s9 Meanwhile, in some of the circuits, judges 
who denied the propriety of their executing the Act in a judicial 
capacity had concluded that they might hear disability pension 
claims as self-styled "commissioners,"90 and in that purported ca-
pacity had acted to approve and forward over two hundred such 
claims.91 Declining simply to ratify those actions, Congress pro-
vided in the amended Act that "it shall be the duty of the Secre-
tary at War, in conjunction with the Attorney General, to take 
such measures as may be necessary to obtain an adjudication of 
the Supreme Court of the United States" on entitlement to pen-
mands more leisure than I have been able to devote to it, and a greater share of abilities 
and information than has fallen to my lot." John Wickham, The Substance of an Argu· 
ment in the Case of the Carriage Duties, Delivered before the Circuit Court of the United 
States, in Virginia, May Term, 1795 at 15 (Augustine Davis, 1795). 
87. Pension Act,§§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 243 (1792). The Act's subsequent legislative history 
is chronicled in Maeva Marcus et al., eds., 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 1789-1800 at 725-26 (Columbia U. Press, 1985} ("Documentary 
History"). 
88. Chief Justice Jay and Justices Cushing, Wilson, Blair and Iredell all expressed 
this view in letters and rulings set forth in lengthy footnotes to Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 409, 410-414 (1792). 
89. Act of February 28, 1793, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 324. 
90. Opinion of the New York circuit court, by Chief Justice Jay, Justice William 
Cushing and District Judge James Duane, quoted in Dallas' report of Hayburn's Case 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.} at 410 n (cited in note 88). Other judges who heard pension claims as 
"commissioners" included Justice James Iredell, whose doubts as to the propriety of that 
course are reflected in correspondence cited in Susan Low Bloch and Maeva Marcus, 
John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 301, 
305 n.16 (1986). 
91. The approved claims were certified to Congress in a "Statement of all claimants 
to be placed on the pension list of the United States, who have obtained certificates from 
the circuit courts, signed as commissioners," forwarded by letter of Secretary of War 
Henry Knox, April25, 1794,9 American State Papers: Claims 107-122 (Gales and Seaton, 
1834). 
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sion benefits by virtue of "the determination of certain persons 
styling themselves commissioners. "92 
Of the disabled Revolutionary War veterans whose benefit 
claims were thus drawn in question, one hundred sixteen, more 
than half the total, were from Connecticut93 where the news that 
federal circuit judges had held the Pension Act to be unconstitu-
tional had been proclaimed a matter of "great political mo-
ment."94 So wrote "Hambden," a pseudonymous advocate for 
Connecticut's adopting a state constitution to replace its colonial 
Charter of 1662, whose dialogue with "Philopatriae" in the pages 
of the Middletown Middlesex Gazette over the summer of 1792 
included a lively debate over judicial review.9s And when the 
validity of "commissioners'" pension claims approvals came up 
for the Supreme Court adjudication, on which Congress had in-
sisted, Connecticut war veterans represented by Connecticut law-
yers were parties in the test cases. 
There were two such cases, brought, heard and disposed of 
during two weeks in February, 1794.96 Counsel for John Chan-
dler,97 whose claim had been forwarded with "commissioners'" 
approval and awaited action by the Secretary of War, moved for 
an order of mandamus requiring Chandler to be placed on the 
pension list.9s Yale Todd (who neither attended Yale College nor 
was related to George Tod)99 was already on the list; he was sued 
by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States for re-
92. Act of February 28, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 324 (cited in note 89). 
93. The count is compiled from the "Statement of all claimants ... ," 9 American 
Stale Papers: Claims at 107-22 (cited in note 91). 
94. Middlesex Gazette, July 21, 1792. 
95. The "Hambden-Philopatriae" exchanges began with "Hambden's" letter in the 
Gazette's weekly issue of June 16, 1792, and ran continuously through the issue of Sep-
tember 8, 1792. The debate over judicial review extended over the July 7th through Au-
gust 11th issues. 
96. Both proceedings are carefully recounted in Bloch and Marcus, 1986 Wis. L. 
Rev. at 307-310 (cited in note 90). As Professor Goebel notes, "(t]here was no constitu-
tional warrant for assumption of original jurisdiction" in these cases. Goebel, Antecedents 
and Beginnings at 565 n.57 (cited in note 2). 
97. Chandler was Colonel John Chandler, of Newtown, a veteran of Valley Forge. 
Franklin Bowditch Dexter, 2 Biographical Sketches of the Graduates of Yale College 575 
(Henry Holt and Co., 1896) ("Biographical Sketches"). He was represented by his son-in-
law, William Edmund. Both were Yale graduates. Id. at 576. 
98. The motion is recorded in minutes of the Court's February, 1794 Term, pub-
lished in Marcus, et al., 1 Documentary History at 222 (cited in note 87). 
99. The "List of Certificates for Connecticut" ranks Yale Todd as a private. "State-
ments of All Claimants ... " 9 American State Papers: Claims at 113 (cited in note 91 ). His 
representation by William Hillhouse is shown in the transcript of the certified copy of the 
Supreme Court record, as found in the papers of United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (15 
How.) 40, 52n (1851), Appellate Case File No. 2968, in the National Archives and re-
printed in Wtlfred J. Ritz, United Stales v. Yale Todd (U.S. 1794),15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
220, 227 (1958). Wtlliam Hillhouse was the brother of James Hillhouse, member of Con-
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fund of benefit payments received, and that action was heard on 
stipulated facts.loo In neither case did the Court or any Justice 
provide an explanation for the ruling, and the judgments were 
recorded only by minute entries: in Chandler's case, "that a Man-
damus cannot issue to the Secretary of War for the purposes ex-
pressed in the said motion,"w1 and in Yale Todd's case, that the 
Court "are of opinion that Judgment be entered for the plaintiff 
[United States, for recovery of the payrnents)."wz 
Commentators disagree as to whether, in these cases, the 
Court held the 1792 Pension Act unconstitutional.103 Brinton 
Coxe was first to point out that its rulings might have had a statu-
tory ground, for the Act did not establish the office of "commis-
sioner" and provided no legal warrant for judges acting in that 
capacity.l04 On the other hand it might have been argued that 
whatever the judges who approved the claims were pleased to 
have called themselves,ws they had in fact acted in their judicial 
capacity, the only official capacity they had-a submission that 
would have reached the question whether the Pension Act's 
mandate for their so acting was constitutional. Contending that 
gress and Treasurer of Yale College. Malone, ed., 5 Dictionary of American Biography at 
52 (cited in note 56) (entry for James Hillhouse). 
100. The Court's minutes contain but a single entry on the Yale Todd case, under a 
caption describing it as an "Amicable Action." The entry notes, as having taken place, 
the reading and filing of pleadings and an "agreement" of the parties, the argument of the 
case and its being taken under advisement, and then states the judgment rendered. Mar-
cus, et al., 1 Documentary History at 228 (cited in note 87). The "agreement," a stipula-
tion, was among original papers in the case, published in a footnote inserted "by order of 
the Court" at the end of Chief Justice Taney's opinion in U. S. v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 
How.) 40, 52 n. (1851). The papers themselves are now reported lost. Bloch and Marcus, 
1986 Wis. L. Rev. at 308, n.33 (cited in note 90). 
101. Marcus, et al., 1 Documentary History at 226 (cited in note 87). 
102. Id. at 228. 
103. The claim that the Court had ruled to hold the Act unconstitutional was made 
for Chandler in Gordon E. Sherman, The Case of John Chandler v. The Secretary of War, 
14 Yale L.J. 431, 431-32 (1905), and for Yale Todd in William M. Meigs, The Relation of 
the Judiciary ro the Constitution, 19 Am. L. Rev. 175, 186 (1885), and in Ritz, 15 Wash. & 
Lee L Rev. at 227 (cited in note 99). It was recently reasserted in an article by Engdahl, 
42 Duke L.J. at 279, 284 n.9 (cited in note 84). 
The opposing view, denying that claim, has distinguished adherents. See, e.g., Goe-
bel, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 at 564-65 n.57 (cited in note 2); David P. Currie, 
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 819, 825-28 (1981); 
Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 81 (Little Brown and Com-
pany, 1926); James Bradley Thayer, 1 Cases on Constitutional Law 105 n.1 (Charles W. 
Sever, 1895). 
104. Brinton Coxe, An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, 13-
14 (Kay and Brother, 1893). 
105. As to their self-style as "commissioners," "Philopatriae" chortled, "This is like 
the case of a Bishop, who at the same time was a general, and much addicted to swearing 
profanely. He swore not as a bishop but as a military officer." Middlesex Gazette, July 28, 
1792. 
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such a submission was in fact made, and accordingly that the 
Court's judgments in the two cases stand as pronouncements on 
the Act's constitutionality, Professor Engdahl cites a minute en-
try identifying the circuit judges' determination approving Chan-
dler's claim as an "Order and Adjudication of the Honorable 
James Iredell and Richard Law106 Esquires Judges of the Circuit 
Court of the United States,"1o1 and asserts that the Court was 
bound by that "pleaded" characterization.1os But weighing 
strongly against Professor Engdahl's contention is the framing of 
the stipulated question in the Yale Todd case, where the parties 
agreed that the Court's judgment should tum on whether "the 
said judges of the Circuit Court, sitting as commissioners, and not 
as a Circuit Court" had authority to approve Todd's claim.109 
Max Farrand's conclusion that it is "altogether probable" that 
"the Court simply avoided the issue"no may be the best, and all 
that can be said. 
But for our purposes as we consider the possibility that Ste-
phen Twining was referring to the Pension Act cases when he 
spoke of the Supreme Court's having "determined this ques-
tion," an inquiry more pertinent than what those cases actually 
held about the Act's constitutionality is what they were per-
ceived to have held. Here again the evidence is conflicting. A 
House Committee's report recommending legislative relief for 
claimants deprived by the Chandler and Yale Todd rulings as-
serted that the judges' certificates approving the claims "are in 
every respect valid, excepting that they are signed by commis-
sioners, and not by the Circuit Court. "m And the Attorney 
General advised that the rulings did not apply to determinations 
made by the District Judge in Maine, who was specially empow-
106. Judge Law was U.S. District Judge for the District of Connecticut. Harold 
Chase et al., eds., Biographical Dictionary of the Federal Judiciary 160 (Gale Research 
Company, 1976). 
107. February 5, 1794 Minute Entry, Marcus, et al., 1 Documentary History at 222 
(cited in note 87) (emphasis added). 
108. Engdahl, 42 Duke L.J. at 287-88 n.18 (cited in note 84). 
109. Transcript of the certified copy of the Supreme Court record, Appellate Case 
File No. 2968, reprinted in Ritz, 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 230 (cited in note 99) (empha-
sis added). 
110. Max Farrand, The First Hayburn Case, 13 Am. Hist. Rev. 281, 283 (1908). Con-
curring, Professor Currie asserts not only that the cases "tell us nothing about the Consti-
tution, but they say much about the early Court's attitude toward explanation and 
dissemination of its decisions." CUrrie, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 828 (cited in note 103). 
111. House Committee report on petition of Josiah Witter, March 5, 1794, 9 Ameri-
can State Papers: Claims at 78 (cited in note 91). 
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ered to act as a circuit court and had approved pension claims in 
that judicial capacity, not as a "commissioner."ll2 
But citation of the Chandler and Yale Todd rulings as prece-
dents for claiming the power of judicial review was not long in 
coming. In March, 1802, during the debate on repeal of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1801,113 Connecticut Congressman Samuel Dana 
quoted from the record and legislative history of those cases to 
maintain that "the authority of the judges to decide questions 
arising under the Constitution was fully recognized."H4 And 
when the Court acted many years later to publish the Yale Todd 
case, Chief Justice Taney concluded that, in the light of opinions 
a majority of the Justices had expressed on circuit, its "result" 
was that "the power proposed to be conferred" by the 1792 Act 
on the circuit courts "was not judicial power within the meaning 
of the Constitution, and was, therefore, unconstitutional, and 
could not lawfully be exercised by the courts."ns 
So Twining, had he known of the Chandler and Yale Todd 
cases,n6 might well have understood that "the Supreme Court of 
the USA have [sic] determined [the] question" of the legitimacy 
of the power of judicial review. But the Court had given him 
nothing he could use in arguing for that power before a tribunal 
insistent on hearing reasons for it: he would have to "resort to 
principle." 
VI. THE MOOT COURT ARGUMENT 
As framed by agreement, the proposition to be argued in the 
Moot Court did not specify whether judicial review was to be 
addressed as a matter of federal or state constitutional law. The 
choice was significant, for the affirmative of the proposition was 
formidably difficult to maintain under the then law of Connecti-
112. Letter from Attorney General William Bradford to Secretary of War (June 2, 
1794), John W. Wallace Collection, Vol. III, Pennsylvania Historical Society, quoted in 
Bloch and Marcus, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. at 316, n.56 (cited in note 90). 
113. Judiciary Act, 2 Stat. 89 (1801 ). 
114. Annals of Congress, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., 903-04, 920-25 (1802). 
115. U.S. v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 53n. (1851). 
116. Since Yale president Stiles encouraged students interested in pursuing legal ca-
reers to seek out local lawyers, Morgan, The Gentle Puritan at 391 (cited in note 20), we 
may suppose that, while undergraduates, all three Moot Court advocates had become 
acquainted with members of the Connecticut bar. And they would have met members of 
the judiciary at public Phi Beta Kappa exercises. In January, 1795, during 1\vining's and 
Tod's senior year, the anniversary of the Society's founding was celebrated at a meeting at 
the New Haven State House, "attended by the Hon'ble Judges of the Superior Court and 
a large number of other respectable gentlemen." Phi Beta Kappa Society, Alpha of Con-
necticuJ, Minutes of Meetings, August, 1787-June, 1801, MS in the Archives and Manu-
script Division, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University. 
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cut, where, with the Charter of 1662 still the organic instrument 
of government, there was no constitutionally ordained principle 
of separation of powers,111 and judges were appointed annually 
by the legislature.11s Thus Twining would avoid, and Tod and 
Williams would include state law references in their respective 
arguments. 
The second manuscript volume of the Litchfield Moot Court 
reports begins by listing the Society's members and officers as 
they were on August 5, 1797, the date of the first argument re-
ported in that volume. Society offices were newly filled, as the 
constitution required. Cyrus Swan was president and ex officio 
Chief Judge; for the argument on judicial review he sat with Eli-
jah Hubbard and John Starke Edwards as Associate Judges. 
Hubbard had graduated from Yale in Tad's class, and was a fel-
low member of Phi Beta Kappa. Edwards, a Princeton graduate, 
was a son of Pierpont Edwards, a prominent lawyer and political 
figure, and a grandson of Jonathan Edwards.I19 
Thomas Scott Williams was clerk, as well as one of the coun-
sel. His entire report of the case follows:120 
* * * 
Thursday, August 31, 1797 
Messrs. HuBBARD, SwAN, EDWARDS, upon the bench. 
By leave of the society the case came up in a form differ-
ent from that prescribed by the constitution-viz. by way of 
question- "Have the judiciary, a right to declare laws-which 
are unconstitutional-void?"-
MR. TwiNING in support of the affirmative. A written 
Constitution binding the powers of Government is a novel 
thing; it is known only in France and the United States. Other 
nations have the name of a Constitution without the thing -
from what has taken place under such Governments we can 
therefore argue nothing. We must then resort to principle to 
determine this case and tho the Supreme Court of the USA 
117. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395, 398 (1798) (separate opinions 
of Paterson and Iredell, JJ.) (cited in note 50); Wesley W. Horton, The Connecticut State 
Constitution 8 (Greenwood Press, 1993). 
118. Dwight Loomis and J. Gilbert Calhoun, eds., The Judicial and Civil History of 
Connecticut 133 (The Boston History Co., 1895). 
119. Samuel H. Fisher, Biographical Catalogue, 47 (Yale U. Press, 1946) (cited in 
note 11); McKenna, Tapping Reeve at 3-26 (cited in note 1). 
120. The report begins on page 33 of the "Continuation of Reports of Cases Argued 
and Determined in Moot Hall Society from August 5th 1797 to July 12, 1798," (cited in 
note 25). Bracketed references here inserted in the text mark the beginning of succeeding 
pages. 
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have [sic] determined this question- their [sic] opinion will be 
made no use of in the present case. If the Legislative & judi-
cial powers are vested in the same body of men, this question 
would not arise, but as the Legislature of [34] the USA do [sic] 
not possess judicial powers this question may with propriety 
be made. It will be proper to consider where this power 
should be Lodged, and the consequences of the Legislatures 
exercising it. 
Admitting that the Legislature have [sic] the same integ-
rity as the judges, if they were of equal capacity it would be 
immaterial which of them possessed this power, but it cannot 
be denied that in point of judgment the judiciary are [sic] su-
perior to the Leg'r. Greater abilities are requisite for the dis-
charge of their office than to perform the duties of a 
Legislator. By their exercises, and their habits, they are better 
fitted to judge with coolness & deliberation what laws inter-
fere with the Constitution than the Leg'r, in which Laws are 
sometimes passed rather from the heat of party than the 
strength of reason. But are there not motives, which will in-
duce the one body to act wrong, which will not operate upon 
the other-Do we not find that Legislatures are always en-
deavoring to extend their power, and is it safe to entrust a 
body of men with power to extend their power? [35] In Eng-
land the House of Commons and the King have been con-
stantly endeavouring to encroach upon each other - and in 
their struggles for power the rights of the people were little 
regarded.-But can the same be said of the judicial depart-
ment? It is impossible for them to encroach upon the Legisla-
tive, upon whom they depend for even their very existence-
and it is an object to which their ambition would not aspire. 
Admitting that Congress have [sic] this power- The Con-
stitution limits the power of the Legisl'e and from that do [sic] 
they [sic] derive all the power which they [sic] possess.- When 
then Congress pass [sic] a law, they [sic] show that in their [sic] 
opinion it is agreeable to the Constitution - if contrary to the 
Constitution how is it to be prevented from operating? It 
must operate until new members are chosen who perhaps will 
not repeal it, and if they do, the people may have suffered 
great inconveniences from it before its repeal. 
Thus the limitations of the powers of Government, by the 
Constitution will be considered [36] as merely advisory and we 
at once adopt the doctrine of the omnipotence of the Legisla-
ture. And if they are to be the sole judges of the unconstitu-
tionality of their own acts their power cannot be said to be 
limited by the constitution - for to a limited power it is essen-
tial that there be some man or body of men who may declare 
when the limits prescribed are exceeded.-
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It is incident to the Legislature to make laws, to the judi-
ciary to interpret them. The Constitution is the law of the 
land. If then one statute contradicts it the judges must decide 
which shall stand - else they are only judges of statute law - not 
of the supreme law of the Land. When two statutes are con-
tradictory, no one disputes but that the judges may declare 
which of them shall operate. - When then a statute is contrary 
to any other branch of the law, there is the same reason that 
the judges should declare which should be considered as law. 
It is said that this power elevates the judges above the 
Legislature and that it makes them Legislators. [37] But this is 
not true, for by exercising this power the judges do not make 
laws, they only declare what is law. 
It is more safe to entrust this power in the hands of the 
judiciary - they [sic] cannot extend it, but can only curtail the 
power of others. - It is a power which in their hands cannot be 
abused. It is a power to the proper exercise of which they 
alone are adequate. 
MR. Too AND (MR.] WILLIAMS On the negative-
The right of the judiciary to this power is argued from the 
necessity of checks upon the Legislature - for this the Consti-
tution has made proper provision, by giving each branch of the 
Legislature a negative upon the doings of the other. As to the 
omnipotence of the Legislature they are [sic] for a time om-
nipotent - they are the representatives of the people, & while 
they continue so they have all the power of the people in their 
hands. If they abuse this power - if they exercise it in a man-
ner they ought not - for this too the Constitution has provided 
[38] a remedy, and nothing is more easy than for the people by 
a change of men, to effect a change of measures. In this con-
sists the superiority of our constitution, that while the Legisla-
ture possesses all the energy of a British parliament, yet they 
are so dependent upon their constituents, that they cannot or 
dare not misuse their power. But supposing this otherwise, is 
it not absurd that they who depend upon the Legislature for 
their seats, should have the Authority to controul, to check & 
restrain the power of the Legislature? If the Legislature are so 
corrupt as to need the checks gentlemen wish to impose, will 
they not appoint men to fill the seats of justice, who will be 
subservient to their pleasure, who will declare only those laws 
void which the Legislature are willing should be annulled? 
But it becomes here important to determine by what au-
thority the judges claim a right to this power, do they derive it 
from the Constitution? This has not even been pretended. 
Have the people given them this power? 
(39] The people have spoken by the constitution, in which 
it is not claimed that there is any such authority given. - It is 
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plain then that it must be an assumption of power by the 
judges if they pretend to any such Authority. 
Much has been said concerning the desire Legislatures 
have to extend their power - this is granted to be true, but is 
this rage for power confined to Representatives of the people? 
Do not we find it extend[s] itself to other classes of men? Can 
we at once determine that the judicial department are, [sic] & 
will continue to be free from it? No! Whenever the judiciary 
of the USA assume [sic] the power, which it is now contended 
they [sic] ought to assume, they will show to the world that the 
judicial department are [sic] not less free from a desire to in-
crease the power which they [sic] now enjoy [sic] than any 
other department of the Government. And by their eagerness 
to grasp at power, they will demonstrate that they are the men 
least fit to be entrusted with it. 
It is true that inconveniences may result to the people if 
the Legislature will act contrary to the Constitution, but they 
may have this to console them that such a law will soon be 
repealed, [40] perhaps by the very men who framed it, when 
they find it disagreeable to the people. But where is our secur-
ity if this power is in the hands of the judges? If they declare a 
law void, because unconstitutional, which is not so, how are 
the people ever to receive the benefit of that law? As judges 
are bound by precedent if new ones should be appointed, they 
would consider themselves as bound by the adjudication of the 
old, so that by the error of one set of judges the people might 
be deprived of a law calculated solely for their benefit. 
But if the judges have a right to determine the constitu-
tionality of a law they have the same right to determine 
whether it is a just, moral, or politic law - for it is as much 
against the duties of congress to pass such a law, as it [sic] to 
pass an unconstitutional one. If then a law is passed which is 
immoral or unjust in its tendencies or impolitic in its effects, 
the judges, by the rule which it is now contended they ought to 
adopt - may intervene, & prevent the carrying into execution 
any law which they may think likely to be injurious to the 
public. 
[41] This will in fact put all the power of the Legislature 
into their hands, and our Legislature [sic] will become mere 
cyphers [sic] in the government- not an act can they [sic] pass 
but must be scrutinized by the judges and receive their sanc-
tion before it can be considered as a Law obligatory upon the 
people. - - - Not only the highest tribunals, but the lowest 
Courts of judicature throughout the USA, as it respects those 
within their jurisdiction, may declare any law enacted by the 
supreme Legislative authority to be void, because their minds 
are not sufficiently enlarged to discover the design of the Leg-
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islature in passing it. Thus the business of our Courts will be 
entirely changed & instead of declaring what is law, they will 
declare what ought not to be Law. 
* * * * * 
HuBBARD JusTICE was of opinion that the judiciary had a 
right to declare laws void when unconstitutional. He did not 
think it followed however that because they [sic] had this 
power they [sic] must have the power of declaring them void 
because immoral or impolitic - neither did he see any absurd-
ity, as had been contended, in investing them with such power, 
because appointed by the Legislature. 
[42] The judges being brought up to the study of law be-
ing men of the greatest eminence, and generally superior to 
the same number of men in the Legislature, must be better 
fitted for the exercise of this power than the legislative body -
and to preserve the Constitution from encroachments it is nec-
essary that they exercise such power - and tho it is said that the 
people by a change of the Legislature may prevent the effects 
of innovations, yet by a law passed in the first session of a new 
Congress infinite mischief might be effected before a repeal 
could be obtained. 
EDWARDS JusTICE. The Constitution has given to the 
Legislature the power of making Laws - to the judges a right 
of interpreting them - but we do not find that it has given to 
them the power which it is now contended they ought to have, 
& we can hardly suppose that if it had been designed to invest 
them with a power so great and important, it would not have 
been mentioned in the Constitution. 
SwAN, CHIEF JusTICE gave his opinion with diffidence as 
he knew it was opposed to that of men to whose opinions the 
greatest deference ought to be paid - not however because the 
lowest Courts would [43] decide upon the validity of an act of 
Congress[-] this could have no weight seeing their [sic] deci-
sions were liable to be reversed by the Supreme Court. 
Neither did he think the case of two opposing statutes com-
pared with this, as here the question was whether the judges 
had a right to determine that there was such an opposition -
and whether they might act in direct opposition to a positive 
act of the supreme Legislature. 
The right of judging of the Constitutionality of their [sic] 
own acts is a power which the Legislature may abuse, and this 
is the case with all the power which they possess. This is a 
power which the judges may likewise misuse, and [it] could be 
but of little service to take power from one body of men & 
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place it in the hands of another sett [sic] of men, if they were 
equally likely to abuse it. 
Test. T. S. WILLIAMS, CLERK 
* * * 
VII. POSTSCRIPT 
Despite its two-to-one rejection in the Moot Court, judicial 
review was restored to the curriculum at Litchfield when James 
Gould took over Reeve's introductory lecture. Two students 
who heard Gould in 1802 each noted him as saying that it was 
"universally acknowledged" that statutes conflicting with consti-
tutional mandates are void, and that courts "may, and must" pro-
nounce them so.121 
The Moot Court fell into decline, and eventually its practice 
changed. By the summer of 1798 arguments were being care-
lessly and perfunctorily reported, and some had to be put over 
when counsel came to sessions unprepared.1z2 By 1803 the Court 
had been taken over by the faculty, with Gould presiding over 
most of the arguments, assigning the questions, and issuing rul-
ings on the merits.l23 Eventually the rulings became predeter-
mined "right answers." By 1822, when Horace Mann's 
classmates elected him the Court's "attorney general," Gould 
was "reading the arguments to sustain his decision[s]," and not 
welcoming challenges.124 Not surprisingly there was a revival of 
interest in student-run organizations. "[S]ocieties established for 
improvement in forensic exercises, which are entirely under the 
121. Aaron Burr Reeve, 3 Manuscript Notes of Lectures by Tapping Reeve at 
Litchfield Law School, taken down by Aaron Burr Reeve, 1802-3 at 30 (1802); William Van 
Duersen, 1 Lectures taken down by our father, William Van Duersen while at Litchfield 
Law School somewhere about 1800 at 28 (1802-03). Aaron Burr Reeve was Tapping 
Reeve's only son; his notebooks are now at Yale in the Heinecke Rare Book Library. Van 
Duersen's notebooks are in the Connecticut State Library at Hartford. Both record 
Gould as citing Alexander Hamilton's argument in No. 78 of The Federalist, which had 
just been republished in a third edition, The Federalist on the New Constitution (George F. 
Hopkins, 1802). Gould would add other citations as he repeated the lecture in subse-
quent years. His manuscript lecture notes, "A system of municipal law, comprised in a 
course of lectures delivered at Litchfield in the State of Connecticut," are in the archives 
of the Litchfield Historical Society. 
122. The record simply peters out. The last entry concludes by naming counsel as-
signed for the next session. 2 Litchfield Moot Court MS at 180 (July 12, 1798) (cited in 
note 25). 
123. Bound with volume 4 of William Van Duersen's notes (cited in note 121), is a 
very cursory record of questions argued from February, 1803 to August, 1803, with one or 
two sentence summations of Gould's and, in a few of the cases, Reeve's rulings. 
124. Mary Tyler Mann, Life of Horace Mann 30-32 (Walker, Fuller and Company, 
1865) (quoting a letter from his classmate, Jessup W. Scott). 
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control of the students" are mentioned as existing in addition to 
the Moot Court, in the "Advertisement" for the school, which 
Gould published in 1828.125 
The students who participated in the argument over judicial 
review had widely different postgraduate careers. Cyrus Swan, 
who presided as Chief Judge, went on to a small town practice in 
Sharon, Connecticut.I26 Elijah Hubbard became Middletown's 
leading banker, and was "repeatedly mayor" of that Connecticut 
city.121 John Starke Edwards was a pioneer of the Connecticut 
Western Reserve; elected to Congress from Ohio in 1812, he died 
before he could take his seat.I28 Stephen Twining spent the re-
mainder of his life in New Haven, in private practice, in various 
city offices, in Yale's financial administration, and as Steward of 
the college.129 Thomas Scott Williams fulfilled the promise of his 
youth, gaining distinction in a legal career which culminated on 
the Connecticut Supreme Court, from which he retired in 1847 at 
the mandatory age of seventy after thirteen years as Chief 
Justice.Bo 
In August, 1807, almost ten years to the day after he had 
argued against the power of judicial review in the Litchfield 
Moot Court, George Tod took an opposite position as a judge of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Joining with Chief Judge Saumel 
Huntington in a two-to-one decision which they sought to ex-
plain to the citizenry in separate opinions published in newspa-
pers,m Tod held first to recognize the power, then to exercise it 
by holding unconstitutional a popular law which permitted jus-
tices of the peace to determine civil claims for amounts not ex-
ceeding fifty dollars.I32 Solely for this ruling the Ohio House 
voted overwhelmingly to impeach Judge Tod, and he was tried by 
125. Gould, Advertisement (cited in note 12). 
126. Loomis and Calhoun, Judicial and Civil History at 325 (cited in note 118). 
127. Dexter, 5 Biographical Sketches at 152 (cited in note 97). 
128. fisher, Biographical Catalogue at 47 (cited in note 11). 
129. Dexter, 5 Biographical Sketches at 173 (cited in note 97). 
130. Id. at 122. 
131. The case was Rutherford v. M'Faddon, decided by the Ohio Supreme Court sit-
ting in Steubenville, Jefferson County, Ohio, on August 21, 1807, the fifth year of Ohio 
statehood. The Huntington and Tod opinions were published in Ohio newspapers some 
months later; they are reprinted in Ervin H. Pollack, Ohio Unreponed Judicial Decisions 
Prior to 1823 at 71-94 (A. Smith Co., 1952). No opinion was written by the court's third 
member, Daniel Symmes, whose dissent was noted in a news item carried in the following 
day's Steubenville Western Herald. Regular official reporting of Ohio Supreme Court 
decisions began with volume 1 of the Ohio Reports, published in 1824. 
132. Act of February 12, 1805, § 5, 3 Ohio Laws 14, 21. The fifty dollar limit was held 
to infringe the Ohio constitution's guarantee of an "inviolate" right to jury trial. Ohio 
Constitution of 1802, Art. VIII, § 8. Justices of the peace were not empowered to sum-
mon juries. 
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the Senate, Huntington having meanwhile resigned from the 
bench upon his election as governor. Fifteen of twenty four Ohio 
senators, one short of the required two thirds majority, voted for 
Tod's conviction.133 
Fortunately for Tod, the prosecutors at his impeachment 
trial never learned of his argument in the Litchfield Moot Court. 
But the tactical skill and the eloquence he had gained as a de-
bater were well employed in his defense. Sensing that his oppo-
nents would not expose themselves to a charge that they sought 
legislative reversal of a court's judgment of a legal question it was 
competent to decide, he answered the indictment by tendering 
only the claim of such competence-the claim to the power of 
judicial review-resting, as he concluded his prayer for acquittal, 
on "his hopes, that the issue will give stability and value to our 
rights and liberties. "134 
133. An article by the late William T. Utter, Judicial Review in Early Ohio, 14 Missis-
sippi Valley Hist. Rev. 3 (1927) is still the most complete published narrative. William T. 
Utter, The Frontier State 44-61 in Carl Wittke, ed., 2 The History of the State of Ohio 
(Ohio State Archaelogical and Historical Society, 1942), and Andrew R. L. Cayton, The 
Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics in the Oh_W Country, 1780-1825 at 99_-108 <!<.ent 
State U. Press, 1986) provide briefer accounts m a broader context of Ohto pohttcal 
history. . . 
134. Answer to the Article of Impeachment, Record of the Proceedmgs of the Hrgh 
Court of Impeachment on the Trial of George Tad, Ohio Senate, 7th (misprinted "sixth") 
General Assembly, 59, 74, (December 7, 1808) (published as an Appendix). 
